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This paper examines the net effect of Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 onto market 
valuation of bank holding shares. Overall analysis finds significant price growth in the years 
following the SOX Act. At the same time liquidity of the bank shares has improved, which 
implies SOX Act has produced benefits for US listed bank holdings. When analyzing shorter 
sequences, we confirm that banking industry enjoys reputation as well regulated industry as 
opposed to other industries, which drove the share prices and liquidity up. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On 25th of July 2002 the US president has signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX Act) as a response to severe corporate scandals that have shaken the economic 
scene of the US. The SOX Act requires intensifying of financial reporting, auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility and other internal control mechanisms of all 
the US publicly listed companies and establishes penalties often to the extent of 
criminal accountability if the rules are not obliged (Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002). 
The important question is, conditional on the fact that the SOX Act imposed 
significant additional compliance costs to the companies, what consequences has it 
produced. Given the costs were indeed significant, companies’ response on SOX 
Act could have been various - the companies could agree with compliance expenses, 
but also could go ‘dark’ (deregister from Security Exchange Commission but still 
keep trading their securities at OTC), completely withdraw from US markets and 
become private (as in Leuz, 2007) or register at a less regulated equity market 
abroad instead (noticed in Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010). Since the compliance 
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costs of the SOX Act reduced the net benefits of US listing, for some foreign 
companies, the value of a listing became negative and hence led these companies to 
choose to deregister. It is a fact that multinational companies involve in international 
profit shifting that depends, as Huizinga and Laeven (2008) mention, on tax regimes 
on specific countries. Companies optimize their tax burdens using various 
mechanisms. Taxes, as well as compliance costs are consequences of governmental 
policies. It could be expected that the banks would (as in Demirguc – Kunt and 
Huizinga (2001) research mentioned in the Huizinga and Laeven article) 
accommodate to regulatory environments of their headquarters versus subsidiaries 
as a response to SOX Act implementation, as they did when shifted profits with 
respect to tax rates of countries of their subsidiaries. When considering what the 
consequences of SOX Act onto US publicly listed companies actually could be, we 
can present two opposing arguments. 
Firstly, we can agree that SOX Act imposes significant costs on companies. 
Ahmed, McAnally, Rasmussen and Weaver (2010) note that direct costs are 
dominated by audit fees, however other types of costs have made significant 
negative effects on operating performance of companies as well. Krishnan, Rama 
and Zhang (2008) analyze the SOX Act disclosures of firms and conclude that the 
compliance burden is uneven with respect to the size of companies Indirect costs 
count for the extra costs that firms that are going public incur (by D’Aquila, (2004)). 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2010) mention magnified risk-aversion of the CEOs due 
to increased scrutiny which can cause lower growth prospects. Both types of the 
costs can negatively affect companies’ performances, and therefore the share prices. 
However, another view can be argued - as Coates (2007) notes, SOX Act is 
perceived as a promise for future benefits: as the increased financial disclosure takes 
place, information asymmetry decreases, causes lower risk perceived by market and 
translates into lower equity costs (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney Jr. and Lafond, 
2009). Aligned with this is a research by Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2008). They 
observe long-term significant liquidity improvements signaling recovery of the 
investors’ trust after the period of corporate scandals. SOX Act added to the 
reliability of financial reports, reduced information asymmetry which in turn 
resulted in improved market liquidity. However, the effect was positively related to 
the firm size, meaning the larger firms enjoyed the benefit more. 
The focus of this analysis will be determining which effect – costs or 
benefits – has dominated in the investors’ perception of the SOX Act. We wonder if 
the investors have considered the SOX Act as the determinant of the lower company 
profitability, the increased probability of discovering another corporate fraud or the 
overregulation in the U.S. market. The effect of SOX Act could have been perceived 
by the investors in completely opposite direction – as a long-awaited tool bringing 
order to chaotic markets, increasing the accuracy of information and lowering 
probability of another frauds occurring. 
We will try to find the approximate answer by using the prices of the bank-
holdings’ shares. There are two reasons behind the choice of this industry. Firstly, 
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the SOX Act prescripts intensive investigation on whether the investment banks 
(usually organized in the form of a bank holding) have assisted public companies in 
manipulating their earnings and covering their true financial condition (Sarbanes – 
Oxley Act of 2002). The publicly listed bank holdings do not only have to cope with 
the compliance, but have higher potential to be revealed as having involvement in 
one or more corporate scandals, which adds to perceived riskiness by the investor 
community. Secondly, financial institutions are subject to more intense examination 
especially in US, where the financial markets are considered to be highly regulated 
(Wall Street Journal, 2008). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the SOX Act, 
often seen as a one-size-fits-all regulation (and therefore less industry specific) 
would not cause any significant additional costs to the bank holdings, since they 
might have such level of transparency established ex ante. 
Moreover, regulators often impose certain equity ratio or level of 
capitalization to banks. When the banks issue new shares, it can imply that they are 
becoming safer due to compliance with the regulation and thus become more liquid 
(Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian, 1998). 
In further sections we find the SOX Act has not caused any significant 
operating expenses for bank holdings and that it has increased liquidity of the bank 
holdings’ shares. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents literature overview on 
the matter, section 3 explains and argues research design, section 4 presents the 
results and lastly, sections 5 and 6 provide the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
The research on the consequences of SOX Act has reached ambiguous 
conclusions. Important points were made when contemplating the costs of SOX Act 
compliance. Zhang (2007) uses foreign companies’ returns as a control to 
distinguish SOX Act effect from other contemporaneous effects. Zhang achieves the 
results that are significantly in favor of the hypothesis that SOX Act imposes net 
costs on complying firms measured by the drop of the stock prices. However, the 
choice of the right control group of markets and the interdependence of the markets 
all over the world with local news occurrence hinder the findings. 
Ahmed, McAnally, Rasmussen and Weaver (2010) focus on actual, realized 
(non audit) costs including indirect, opportunity costs of SOX Act. Audit costs are 
eliminated in order not to overestimate the actual cost effect of SOX Act and to 
provide feedback in more holistic manner taken with respect to the firm specific 
characteristics and firm specific compliance costs. The paper documents significant 
drop in cash-flow profitability after SOX Act establishment. 
Litvak (2007) has found a more clean way to measure the effect of SOX Act 
in terms of the stock prices but in the case of non-US cross listed companies in the 
US. Since not all of such companies have to comply with the act, a plausible control 
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group is available. Litvak finds significant drop in stock prices during key act 
announcements and attributes it to the SOX Act enactment while suggesting that 
investors perceived the SOX Act as a net-cost causing event. Moreover, companies 
that had better disclosure habits before SOX Act suffered higher price drop 
compared to other companies because they were perceived as companies doubling 
the compliance costs by the market. However, it is necessary to note that sample 
selection bias can hinder the relevance of these conclusions, since we are not exactly 
sure based on which principle the foreign companies are chosen (or excluded) to be 
subject to SOX Act. 
Nonetheless, vast literature on SOX Act is claiming that the short-term costs 
cannot offset long-term benefits, thus being in utter conflict with the standpoints 
above. Jain and Rezaee (2006) examine capital-market reactions to the promising 
events for the SOX Act to pass by observing stock prices. Investors have considered 
SOX Act enactment as good news because, as authors note, significantly positive 
abnormal returns were detected for this kind of events, and vice versa (also found by 
Li, Pincus and Olhoft Rego, 2008). Moreover, they find that companies with more 
reliable financial disclosure prior to the SOX Act enjoy the benefits of the Act in 
stronger way than other firms do because they have already incurred the costs of 
compliance. 
Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2008) observe the market liquidity around key SOX 
Act events. The authors report that market liquidity measures deteriorate after the 
wave of corporate scandals, suggesting that investors perceived increased risks. 
Moreover, they find that market liquidity measures improve significantly, 
particularly in the long term, after the passage of SOX Act, implying that the 
reforms were successful in restoring markets’ confidence in public financial 
information. The analysis will be relying much on approach and interpretation of 
this paper. 
To conclude the literature overview section, we can note that most of the 
mentioned work suffers from an empirical hurdle – crystallizing the SOX Act effect 
from all the other, contemporaneous events’ effects in a proper way.  
 
 
3.  Research Design 
 
3.1 Data and model 
A panel of data was retrieved from Wharton Research Data Services on 47 
biggest US publicly listed bank holdings (list of bank holdings comes from National 
Information Center) whereas the macroeconomic indicator data originates from 
World Bank database. The sample covers period from beginning of 2001 to the end 
of 2003. We will be using daily and monthly stock data, quarterly income statement 
entries and yearly data on GDP growth. The entries on bank holdings that have 
defaulted during the recent financial crises of 2008 were dropped out of the analysis 
due to lack of data. We are aware that this fact can cause the estimates to be biased 
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upwards, because if the investors really assess increased riskiness of the banks 
during corporate scandals and SOX Act, their concerns would be justified and we 
would expect effect of the concerns (measured by liquidity of the shares) to be more 
pronounced. Moreover, the fact that we include only the biggest bank holdings of 
US can add to the underestimation of investor’s concerns because as Jain, Kim and 
Rezaee (2008)  note, the liquidity measures are known to increase with the firm size. 
The goal of this analysis will be to determine what net effect of SOX Act in 
the investors’ opinion was. To do so, we will use a ‘noisy’ measure as the dependent 
variable – stock prices. The main explanatory variable will be a dummy for the 
period after the SOX Act implementation. We will use measures of operating 
performance, liquidity of the banks’ shares, size of the bank holding and annual rate 
of gross domestic product growth as the controls. We assume structure on the error 
term that contains constant unobserved company specific effect, meaning that there 
is an omitted variable – a characteristic of the observed bank holding that might 
affect the dependent variable, but at the same time be correlated with one of the 
explanatory variables (for example, CEO’s ability). 
The regression model (including the control variables) we will use is the 
following: 
(1) 
In which i stands for bank holding and t stands for date. Error term has a 
structure accounting for bank holding unobserved fixed effect ui and the actual error 
term of the model vit: 
  (2) 
Detailed reasoning behind this specification follows. 
 
3.2 Choice of variables 
Share price is considered to be a reflection of the relevant information 
available at the market. As Mukherjee and Dukes (1989) note, available information 
forms intuitive judgment and sentiment of investors and as such plays an important 
role in pricing the shares. New disclosure rules restore the information content of 
stock prices (DeFusco, Mishra and Raghunandan, 2010) and investors account for 
that in their expectations. We are interested in information content of the stock 
prices at the time of SOX Act enactment.  
Arguments for share price decrease are valid if the bank holdings become 
perceived as more risky due to increased scrutiny and hence the probability of a 
fraud occurring and also if the market becomes illiquid due to overregulation, as in 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) and Minardi, Sanvicente and Monteiro 
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(2006). Also, share prices of banks might drop due to decreased operating 
performance. Share price increase can be argued as well, because as the flow of 
information about companies increases, the uncertainty decreases and consequently 
higher liquidity causes share prices to increase (Brennan, and Hughes, 1991). In 
addition, share prices might increase due to demand effect – if banks are perceived 
as well regulated as opposed to other industries, SO X Act might bring up increased 
uncertainty of new frauds occurring that would affect the other industries more 
severely. That might drive the demand after the bank shares. 
Operating income to sales ratio represents a measure of operating 
performance that is supposed to be the one most noticeably affected by the increased 
compliance costs. We expect this measure to cause the earnings of the bank holdings 
to drop, which would then affect the share price decline, as found in a research by 
Ahmed, McAnally, Rasmussen and Weaver (2010). 
Proportional bid-ask spread or daily bid-ask spread divided by the monthly 
price of a share is a commonly used measure of liquidity of a share (used in Jain, 
Kim and Rezaee (2008) for instance). We can expect effect in both directions of 
liquidity measure onto the stock prices. Higher bid-ask spread of a share signals 
higher information asymmetry, which causes the liquidity of the share to drop as 
well as the price of the share (Minardi, Sanvicente and Monteiro, 2006). The key 
driver of decline in liquidity is deterioration of information environment (Jain, Kim 
and Rezaee, 2008). Yet, SOX Act introduces more information-symmetric 
environment which might bring the share prices up. 
Each of the arguments can be further magnified in the case of bank holding 
shares. Banks are under additional suspicion on the one hand, but are more regulated 
ex ante on the other one. We anticipate that both of the liquidity arguments took 
place in the market valuation, but possibly in different time dimensions. We will test 
this by using different time frames. 
Dummy variable post-sox is a difference-in-difference estimator that takes 
value one for the years, months or days following the SOX Act enactment, 
depending on specification of the model. Finally, assets and GDP growth annual 
rate are additional control variables used in long-term specifications. When the 
analysis focuses on monthly or daily frame, these variables become constant and we 
drop them. 
Table 1. Overview of expected effects of controls on dependent variable. Estimation technique 
Share price  Increase Decrease 
Operating performance  A.        benefits C.            costs 
Liquidity  B.        benefits D.           costs 
Other factors (ε)        ?  ? 
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3.3 Estimation Technique 
When estimating the model, we will account for company fixed effects. As 
mentioned in Nichols and Schaffer (2007) since we are unable to assume identical 
and independent distribution over the error term (observations and errors might be 
correlated within i), we will control for clustered errors2. In first estimations, 
dummy variable will equal one for the years 2002 and 2003. This approach was used 
by Ahmed, McAnally, Rasmussen and Weaver (2010). 
While mimicking the event study approach as in Jain, Kim and Rezaee 
(2008), we will narrow down the analysis with respect to time by changing the time 
range of the dummy variable. To start, we will include four dummy variables for 
four time windows (m1 - m4): first, the benchmark period from January to 
September of 2001; second, the period of accounting scandals from October 2001 to 
June 2002; third, period from July to December 2002 when legislation took place 
and finally January to April 2003 – period when regulation happens. 
Next we will continue narrowing down the time frame to specific days, 
choice of which is argued in Jain and Rezaee (2006). Here four dummies cover four 
periods (d1 - d4): ambiguous period from 14th of February to 25th June 2002, 
period when market suspicions were that SOX Act might not pass from 9th of July 
to 19th of July, period when the SOX Act indeed takes place, 24th of July 2002 to 
7th of August 2002, and finally rest of the time period from 8th of August 2002 until 
30th of July of 2003. 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics and correlations for unbalanced 
panel of the variables used in the analysis. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share prices 32707 43.28797 25.0749 -223 225 
Operating performance 23754 0.378294 0.192985 -0.02211 1.992523 
Liquidity 23957 0.024587 0.015542 0 0.370978 
lnassets 25121 10.78301 1.446264 7.850283 14.04982 
GDP annual growth 25121 1.365981 1.17852 -0.26 2.5 
                                               
2 Ahmed et al (2010) consider the same procedure however decide not to use it referring to a paper by 
Petersen (Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches. The Review of Financial Studies 22 (1), 435 - 480) who concludes that clustered standard 
errors are biased when the number of clusters is small; however, in this case it was necessary due to 
wrong standard errors. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 Share price 
Operating  
performance Liquidity lnassets 
GDP 
annual growth 
Share prices 1     
Operating performance 0.0594 1    
Liquidity -0.0522 -0.0965 1   
lnassets 0.1839 -0.0602 0.0972 1  
GDP annual growth 0.042 0.0132 -0.1711 0.0258 1 
 
 
4.1 Aggregate Analysis 
At first we look at full time frame of the data, therefore post-sox dummy 
will cover years after the SOX Act has passed, i.e. years 2002 and 2003. 
Table 4.Main variables after the SOX Act 
 
Operating performance 
(1) 
Liquidity 
(2) 
ln(Share prices) 
(3) 
postsox 0.080*** -0.006*** 0.022 
 (6.013) (-7.697) (0.507) 
GDP annual growth (%) 0.012*** -0.003*** 0.008 
 (3.359) (-9.519) (1.136) 
lnassets -0.010 0.001** 0.055 
 (-0.650) (2.327) (1.256) 
constant 0.411*** 0.019*** 3.088*** 
 (2.920) (3.317) (6.449) 
Number of observations 23,754 23,957 25,119 
R2 0.039 0.068 0.037 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In the first column of Table 4 we observe highly significant positive effect 
of post-sox dummy on operating performance - on average the operating income has 
increased by 8% of the sales per year after SOX Act (assuming field A in Table 1, 
not sure yet). This is aligned with the fact that bank holdings have overcame 
auditing and similar costs before, so if the share prices indeed drop after the SOX 
Act, it would not be caused by the decrease in operating performance (eliminating 
field C of Table 1). 
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In column 2 we observe negative coefficient of post-sox dummy on 
proportional bid-ask spread. The effect is highly significant and implies that in every 
year of the sample following the SOX Act passage, bid-ask spread of bank holding 
share prices has decreased on average by 0.6% of the monthly share price. Hence, 
the overall liquidity of the bank holding shares increased in the years 2002 and 
2003, which is consistent with the fact that the overall information asymmetry 
decreased and the investors’ confidence in bank holdings was additionally supported 
by SOX Act beneficial effect (could be field B in Table 1). Third column tells us 
that in the years following SOX Act a bank holding share price increase of 2.2% has 
been present, however this effect is insignificant. 
Table 5. Main aggregate analysis 
 OLS OLS FE FE FE FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Operating 
performance 
0.122 0.153 0.380** 0.391** 0.335* 0.357** 
 (0.394) (0.435) (2.124) (2.273) (1.905) (2.122) 
Liquidity -2.027* -2.550* -2.417*** -2.446*** -0.146 -0.160 
 (-1.661) (-1.932) (-6.851) (-6.544) (-0.225) (-0.248) 
Postsox 0.008 -0.003 -0.020 -0.018 0.082*** 0.081** 
 (0.193) (-0.055) (-0.536) (-0.396) (2.812) (2.329) 
GDP annual 
growth (%) 
 0.006  -0.001  -0.006 
  (0.596)  (-0.142)  (-0.808) 
lnassets  0.067  -0.028  -0.012 
  (1.637)  (-0.250)  (-0.112) 
Interaction term     -3.822*** -3.979*** 
     (-4.586) (-4.465) 
Constant 3.715*** 2.994*** 3.324*** 4.080** 3.318*** 3.820** 
 (26.131) (6.048) (52.974) (2.573) (54.473) (2.511) 
Number of 
observations 
22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 
R2 0.010 0.066 0.857 0.857 0.861 0.862 
Company dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The columns 1 and 2 of the Table 5 present results of OLS estimations. 
Mainly insignificant results are captured here, not accounting for bank-specific 
constant unobserved effects. 
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Next we turn to fixed-effects estimations, reported in columns from 3 to 6. 
R2 value has improved heavily, since most of the variation of the variables we 
attribute to the bank specific unobserved effect. Key variables start to make 
statistically significant points: operating performance measure coefficient in column 
3 implies that when the the ratio of operating income to sales increases by one 
percent, share prices would increase on average by 0.38%; this effect has been 
expected and thus, by verifying the significance of the causality and its direction, we 
confirm the effect in field A in Table 1. Measure of liquidity is highly significant 
and when the bid-ask spread increases by one percent of monthly prices, the share 
prices would drop on average by 2.45%; finally, the key variable – post-sox dummy 
has a negative but insignificant coefficient. 
These results give relevance to the findings of OLS regressions, however do 
not provide us with any finding or foundation for reasoning about the matter we are 
primarily interested in – the behavior of share prices after the SOX Act. The 
findings remain similar even when adding control variables, as reported in the 
column 4. 
The ambiguous results gave us an incentive to follow the procedure in 
Ahmed (2010) by interacting liquidity measure with post-sox dummy and thus 
separate the effect of proportional bid-ask spread to pre and post SOX Act years. 
The results are reported in the 5th and 6th column of the Table 5. Post-sox variable 
has a highly significant and positive effect suggesting that after the SOX Act 
implementation, bank holdings’ share prices have increased by 8.2%.  
The interaction term has significant average negative coefficient of 3.82%,  
which means that responsiveness of share prices to proportional spread increased 
after the SOX Act has passed by 3.82 percent more than in the period before. After 
SOX act, liquidity become more compelling – market participants become more 
sensitive to the bid-ask spread when pricing the stocks after SOX Act. 
We conclude the bank holdings have enjoyed benefits after SOX Act 
enactment. Share prices have increased over the observed period due to the fact that 
banks have not incurred any significant drop in operating performance (no 
significant compliance costs) and due to decrease in bid-ask spread that signals 
increased investors’ confidence about the shares, especially in the period after SOX 
Act. Hypothesis that banks are perceived as well regulated despite SOX Act is 
supported and is in accordance with the previous research conclusions. SOX Act has 
contributed to the overall information symmetry in the market in the case of bank 
holding shares. These results can be summarized by left column in Table 1 - share 
price increase and SOX Act benefits for bank holdings, where the effect magnitude 
is divided upon operating performance, liquidity and other unspecified factors 
(possibly the increased demand after bank holding shares). Column 6 reports the 
similar results using additional control variables. 
 
 
 
165 
Market Perception of  SOX Act 
in the Case of US Listed Banks 
 
4.2 Event Analysis 
Table 6 and 7 contain time-narrowed analyses. The monthly approach has 
yielded compelling results (Table 6). First time dummy, m1, is for the benchmark 
period. In this case the coefficient is significantly negative, which means that in this 
(pre-SOX Act) period, as opposed to the following time periods, the prices have 
been on average lower by 6.9%. Liquidity measure is significantly positive. 
Table 6.Event analysis(months) 
 
m1 
(1) 
m2 
(2) 
m3 
(3) 
m4 
(4) 
Operating performance 0.354** 0.327* 0.349* 0.387** 
 (2.065) (1.694) (1.839) (2.040) 
Liquidity -3.733*** -2.389*** -1.370*** -2.298*** 
 (-10.613) (-5.599) (-2.847) (-6.676) 
m1*liquidity 3.988***    
 (4.299)    
m1 -0.069**    
 (-2.515)    
m2*liquidity  0.233   
  (0.339)   
m2  0.008   
  (0.386)   
m3*liquidity   -2.321***  
   (-3.754)  
m3   0.021  
   (0.661)  
m4*liquidity    -1.831 
    (-1.487) 
m4    -0.081*** 
    (-3.430) 
Constant 3.361*** 3.340*** 3.325*** 3.321*** 
 (51.583) (50.117) (51.288) (50.214) 
Number of observations 22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 
R2 0.862 0.856 0.859 0.865 
Company dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Dummy m2 stands for the period of accounting and corporate scandals, 
when the overall uncertainty and asymmetry of information become more 
emphasized. Consistent with this, we note positive (but insignificant) sign of the 
time dummy, which suggests that the bank holding share prices have increased on 
average by 0.8% as opposed to other periods (left column of Table 1).  
Dummy m3 covers legislation period, period when the probability of another 
scandals being discovered is high because the new act is taking place. The share 
prices rise by additional but insignificant 2.1%, whereas liquidity has increased 
significantly. This is consistent with our hypothesis of market perception being in 
favor of bank holding shares – as the uncertainty of the whole market is increasing, 
the bank shares maintain their attractiveness to liquidity traders. 
The last period covering the beginning of the year 2003 shows that market 
participants’ uncertainty might have diminished. The dummy m4 takes up a negative 
and significant value, which suggests share prices have leveled out by 8.08% on 
average. 
When it comes to analysis of specific dates, the results are consistent with 
the assumptions, however not more pronounced (Table 7). Dummy covering the 
days of ambiguous period when the scandals were revealed and SOX Act in 
preparation shows significant average increase in the share prices of 4.72%. 
This short term analysis shows first the prices increased due to more 
emphasized uncertainty towards the overall market and in favor of bank shares, but 
then leveled out, possibly because no unexpected frauds occurred. The results can be 
interpreted as consistent with aggregate analysis, where the bank holding share 
prices on average increase. It is possible to argue that the liquidity of bank shares 
has not deteriorated due to fact that the shares are generally perceived more 
favorably and enjoy industry specific reputation. 
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Table 7. Event analysis (days). 
 
d1 
(1) 
d2 
(2) 
d3 
(3) 
d4 
(4) 
Operating performance 0.299 0.317 0.320* 0.459** 
 (1.511) (1.643) (1.657) (2.451) 
Liquidity -2.305*** -2.440*** -2.309*** -1.448*** 
 (-6.065) (-5.961) (-6.345) (-3.608) 
d1*liquidity 0.541    
 (0.692)    
d1 0.047**    
 (2.535)    
d2*liquidity  0.717   
  (1.229)   
d2  -0.004   
  (-0.136)   
d3*liquidity   -1.149**  
   (-2.342)  
d3   0.037  
   (1.264)  
d4*liquidity    -2.688*** 
    (-2.914) 
d4    -0.026 
    (-1.222) 
     
Constant 3.351*** 3.346*** 3.344*** 3.287*** 
 (48.396) (49.513) (49.688) (51.023) 
Number of observations 22,654 22,654 22,654 22,654 
R2 0.858 0.856 0.856 0.869 
Company dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
5.  Limitations 
 
By accounting for short term and long term dimension of SOX Act effect on 
the share prices of bank holdings in US, we managed to put certain structure to the 
results obtained. However, we do face many empirical drawbacks. Firstly and most 
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importantly – ability to net out the effect of SOX Act onto prices with taking into 
account only the relevant time frame is questionable, since there might have been 
events occurring contemporaneously that we have not controlled for. As noted 
before, finding a plausible control group to net out the pure SOX Act effect is 
difficult due to fact that many (somewhat comparable) countries have applied 
similar regulations at about the same time. The ones that did not do so (UK, for 
instance) have been affected indirectly by SOX Act by welcoming the inflow of 
companies newly deregistered from US markets (as mentioned in Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz, 2010). 
Secondly, we might suffer from sample selection upward bias, due to the 
fact that we have selected only the biggest bank holdings listed in US. Consequences 
of this have been discussed in data section. 
Thirdly, the difficulty of selecting the time windows has taken its due in the 
days-analysis. The daily news reported in media affect the investors’ valuation and 
during this time news created various waves of information on SOX Act (as well as 
other global happenings we have not accounted for). It seems difficult to choose the 
right dates and interpret the corresponding events in isolation without accounting for 
all the media clutter cumulated in investors’ memory. 
Finally, the liquidity measure used in the model can tell us something about 
the information that investors account for when valuing the shares, however the 
model could include other measures as well. 
 
 
6.  Discussions and Conclusions 
 
The focus of this analysis is determining which effect – costs or benefits – 
has dominated in the investors’ perception of the SOX Act enactment in the case of 
US listed bank holdings. We try to account for two time dimensions – short term and 
long(er) term observation. Operating performance has not induced drop of bank 
holding share prices, quite the opposite, implying the banks have not incurred 
significant compliance costs and have been well regulated prior to SOX Act. 
Aggregate data show that shares have risen after the SOX Act, and the liquidity has 
improved as well. Therefore, investor confidence into bank holdings measured by 
the liquidity has improved, especially for the time period following the SOX Act. 
Therefore, SOX Act contributed to the improving of the information symmetry at 
the US bank holding stock market. Bank holdings could be perceived as the ones 
benefiting from SOX Act significantly – since there is possibility that the demand 
after their shares has increased at the cost of other industries’ shares. While 
narrowing down the time frame of the data, we conclude that bank holding share 
prices have increased during the corporate scandals and SOX Act preparation and 
legislation period. However share prices have leveled out in period of 5 months after 
SOX Act has taken place, meaning that the investors recovered from short-term 
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increased uncertainty and began realizing the long-term liquidity benefits implied by 
the new act for the market as a whole. 
Finally, since we have noted no significant drop in operating performance, 
nor an extreme drop in the bank holding shares, we see no empirical reason for 
banks to turn private or list their headquarters or other establishments at other equity 
markets in response to SOX Act and cost optimization. 
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